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Abstract
As an important part of the executive compensation，
perks can play a unique role in facilitating corporate 
performance. The relationship among agency cost, 
perk and corporate performance is a key issue faced 
by scholars. This paper selects companies listed on the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2011 
to 2016 as samples, excluding ST, ST * companies 
and financial insurance companies. We found that 
executive’s perk has a significant negative correlation 
with corporate performance. And executive’s perk has 
a significant positive correlation with agency cost. 
Through the influence of perk on corporate performance 
and agency cost, this study found that agency cost has a 
partial intermediary effect between perk and company 
performance.
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INTRODUCTION
As an important part of the executive compensation，
perks can play a unique role in facilitating corporate 
performance. In recent years, many researchers have done 
a lot of empirical research on the relationship between 
executive compensation and corporate performance, and 
have achieved many results. Among them, according 
to the theory of compensation incentive, the agency 
problem between shareholders and executives can be 
solved by establishing a reasonable incentive mechanism. 
Executives’ incentive mechanism is related to the 
compensation level. The premise of effective incentive for 
executives is how to choose the appropriate compensation 
incentive mechanism. It is necessary to implement 
reasonable incentive for executives and reduce the agency 
cost effectively. 
One of the most important reasons for corporate 
governance is the separation of ownership and control, 
which leads to the principal agent problem. Another 
important reason is that the controlling shareholders or 
major shareholders embezzle the rights and interests of 
minority shareholders, so that the contradictions between 
the controlling shareholders or major shareholders and 
minority shareholders become more obvious, which 
leading to the second type of agency problems. With the 
deepening development of the reform of state-owned 
companies in China, there is controversy surrounding the 
net effect of reducing perk expenditures (Louis, 2018, p. 
83-95). Therefore, the relationship among agency cost, 
perk and corporate performance is a key issue faced by 
scholars.
1.  LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES
1.1  Perk and Corporate Performance
The perks provided by companies for managers are aimed 
at improving the efficiency of corporate management 
(Rajan & Wulf, 2006, pp. 1-33). Jensen believed that it is 
impossible to expect corporate agents to make decisions 
that are consistent with the interests of corporate principals 
without paying any cost and expense. In most cases, it will 
have negative economic effects, reduce the cost and lower 
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the company’s value (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, pp. 305-
360). Hart pointed out that perk is a means for executives 
to seek their interests and a hidden cost of agency costs 
(Hart, 2001, pp. 1079-1100). Luo Hong found that there 
is a significant negative correlation between perks and 
corporate performance in state-controlled listed companies 
through empirical research (Luo & Huang, 2008, pp. 139-
147). Based on the foregoing discussion, the following 
hypothesis is offered for empirical testing:
H1 Perk exerts a negative direct influence on corporate 
performance.
1.2  Perk and Agency Cost
Jensen defined that non-monetary consumption for 
managers is called perk. Since then, many scholars 
have carried out empirical research according to this 
definition (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, pp. 305-360).. Li 
Baobao explained “perk” as excessive consumption of 
managerial resources to maximize utility for managers (Li 
& Huang, 2012, pp. 76-81). As one of the basic factors 
affecting agency costs, perk increases the private utility of 
corporate executives and may also reduce corporate value. 
Williamson argues that perk is a factor that mediates 
conflicts between agents and principals, with negative 
economic effects that ultimately undermine corporate 
value (Williamson, 1979, pp. 233-261). Upon this basis, 
the following hypothesis is offered:
H2 Perk exerts a positive direct influence on agency 
cost.
1.3  Agency Cost and Corporate Performance
Chrisostomos analyzed some British listed companies 
and found that internal and external corporate governance 
mechanisms can reduce agency costs (Florackis, 2008, 
pp. 37-59). Kate Jelinek used the method of TAT and 
management cost to replace agency cost respectively in 
the study of agency cost. It was found that agency cost 
was negative related to company performance (Jelinek 
& Stuerke, 2009, pp. 156-178). Proceeding from the 
foregoing analysis, the following hypothesis is proposed:
H3 Agency cost exerts a negative direct influence on 
corporate performance.
1.4  The Mediating Effect of Agency Cost
Based on the “special evidence - result” approach, there 
are many research results that executive compensation 
incentive has a significant impact on corporate 
performance, but the use of “characteristics-behavior-
result” to study the indirect impact of perk on corporate 
performance is less. In this paper, through the path model, 
the agency cost as an intermediary variable into the 
relationship between perk and corporate performance is 
a new idea. Proceeding from the foregoing analysis, the 
following hypothesis concerning the Mediating effect of 
agency cost is proposed:
H4 Agency cost exerts a mediating effect between perk 
and corporate performance.
2.  DATA AND METHODOLOGY
2.1  Data
This paper selects companies listed on the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2011 to 2016 as samples, 
excluding ST, ST * companies and financial insurance 
companies. After removing companies which frequently 
change executives, lacking complete data, 514 listed 
companies, a total of 2711 observation are as samples. 
Data is from Tai’an database.
2.2  Methdology
The Bootstrap method is used to analyze the intermediate 
effect, which has a high statistical effect. It can make 
the model parameter estimation more accurate and the 
research conclusion more reliable.
2.3  Variables
The following variables are used to test the foregoing 
hypotheses. Their definitions are described as follows 
(Table1).
Table 1
Variable Definition and Description
Variable Code Measures
Corporate performance Roe ROE
Perk Perk The logarithm of the total cost of the eight detailed items under “cash flow for other business activities”
Agency cost AC management expense ratio
Firm Size Size The logarithm of total assets at the end of the year
Financial leverage Debt Debt Asset ratio
Industry Indu Assign 1-12 of the industry excluding the financial and insurance industry 
3.  RESULTS
3.1  Hypothesis Testing
Correlation analysis refers to the dependencies between 
variables, usually expressed by Pearson correlation 
coefficient, and Table 2 is the correlation analysis between 
the main variables. From table 2, we can see that perk and 
agency cost are significantly related; perk and corporate 
performance are significantly related; agency cost and 
corporate performance are significantly related. Therefore, 
H1, H2 and H3 are verified and we consider perk, agency 
cost and corporate performance may interact with each other. 
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Table 2
Important Variables Correlation Analysis
Code Roe Perk AC Size Debt Indu
Roe 1
Perk -0.017** 1
AC -0.045* 0.02* 1
Size 0.04*** 0.17 0.161** 1
Debt -0.13* -0.154** 0.102 0.126** 1
Indu 0.012 -0.047* -0.03 0.108** 0.117** 1
Notes: * p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
3.2  Mediating Effect Testing
The variables include an explicit variable, an intermediate 
variable and a dependent variable. In this paper, we will 
use Bootstrap method to estimate the parameter confidence 
interval, and choose Mplus 7.0 as the analysis software.
According to the conclusion of correlation analysis, 
we find that perk, agency cost and corporate performance 
are all related, and preliminarily verify that agency cost 
may have intermediary effect between perk and corporate 
performance. Therefore, we assume that agency cost 
exerts effect between perk and corporate performance.
In model test (table 3), according to the Bootstrap 
method, the test coefficient C is significant, indicating a 
mediating effect. (P = 0.039), coefficient B1 (P = 0.047) 
was significant at 5% significant level. According to the 
output confidence interval, the confidence interval of 
the parameter ab 95% is [0.001,0.008], indicating that 
the indirect effect is significant. Detection coefficient c’, 
found that the coefficient c’(P = 0.023) was significant at 
5% significance level, indicating that the direct effect is 
significant, there may be other intermediaries. Because 
the symbol of ab and c’ are the same, there are partial 
mediating effects according to the checking process. 
From the above analysis, we can see that agency cost has 
a partial intermediary effect between perk and corporate 
performance. Therefore, H4 is verified.
Table 3
The Mediating Effects of Agency Cost Between the Perk and Corporate Performance
Effect  Estimate SE
ai*bi 95%confidence interval (i=1,2)
Plower limits upper limits
X1->Y（c） 0.605 0.3558 0.180 0.310 0.025
X1->M1(a) -0.570 0.0067 -0.072 -0.187 0.039
M1->Y(b) -0.1469 0.0859 0.214 0.318    0.047
X1->M1->Y(a*b) 0.405 0.227 0.001 0.008 0.039
X1(C’)   0.507 0.618 0.003 0.010 0.023
Fitting Test
P-Value=0.042
GFI=0.845
TLI=1.976
RMSEA=0.037
SRMR=0.032
CONCLUSIONS
In this study, we present the impact of perk on corporate 
performance based on the mediating effect of agency 
cost. We found that executive’s perk has a significant 
negative correlation with corporate performance. And 
executive’s perk has a significant positive correlation with 
agency cost. Through the influence of perk on corporate 
performance and agency cost, this study found that agency 
cost has a partial intermediary effect between perk and 
company performance.
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